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This manuscript explores the ethics of human inoculation experiments in young healthy adults with wild-type severe acute res-
piratory sydrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) as a tool to evaluate vaccine efficacy in the context of the Nuremberg Code, the 
Declaration of Helsinki, and the Belmont Report, and in the context of dose-response relationships with infectious agents. Despite 
societal pressure to develop a SARS-CoV-2 challenge model to evaluate vaccines, we argue that there are substantial risks that cannot 
be adequately defined because the dose of SARS-CoV-2 that causes severe disease in young adults is unknown. In the absence of 
curative therapy, even if a volunteer consents, longstanding ethical codes governing human subjects research preclude the conduct 
of such experiments.
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We are writing to discuss the ethics of 
human challenge experiments with se-
vere acute respiratory sydrome coro-
navirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) as a tool to 
accelerate vaccine licensure. This ap-
proach involves randomizing healthy vo-
lunteers (18 to 25 years old) to vaccine or 
placebo and then infecting all volunteers 
with SARS-CoV-2 to assess vaccine effi-
cacy [1–3]. The justifications for the de-
velopment of this model in young healthy 
adults are that the risks for morbidity and 
mortality in this age group are negligible, 
participants have a right to accept such 
risks “free from paternalistic overreach,” 
and there is a “societal value of reducing 
the time required to identify efficacious 
vaccines against a disease that is creating 
a massive and relentless daily toll” [1, 4, 
5]. Concerns expressed in opposition 
to this approach have centered around 
its utilitarian morality, the possible ad-
verse short-term and long-term health 
outcomes—including death—in the vo-
lunteers, the inability to manage risks as-
sociated with experimental infection, the 
adequacy of informed consent, the time 
required to develop a model, the utility of 
a model in accelerating vaccine develop-
ment, and the reduction in confidence in 
the research community should adverse 
events occur [6–8].
We recently published a letter voi-
cing some of these concerns [8]. Shortly 
thereafter, we were invited to participate 
in a debate with advocates of the human 
challenge experiments, including 1Day 
Sooner, an organization that has signed 
up over 38  000 volunteers from 166 
countries to participate in SARS-CoV-2 
challenge trials, which have entered the 
planning stage in the United Kingdom 
but have yet to receive regulatory ap-
proval [9]. 1Day Sooner has received 
significant coverage, much of it positive, 
in the news media, including but not lim-
ited to stories in National Geographic, 
the New York Post, and CNBC [10–12]. 
In preparation for the debate, which was 
sponsored by the Rikers Debate Project 
and the Central Synagogue of Manhattan 
and can be viewed at https://youtu.be/
v1XpQK8nkFg, we realized that although 
there had been a great deal written con-
cerning the ethics of such experiments 
[2, 3, 13, 14], there had been little direct 
discussion of whether human challenges 
with SARS-CoV-2 are compatible with 
longstanding ethical codes of human 
subjects research.
There are 3 documents that have long 
guided human subjects research: the 
Nuremberg Code, the Declaration of 
Helsinki, and the Belmont Report. The 
overarching theme of these documents 
is that as physicians and scientists, we are 
obligated to protect individuals from ex-
periments that might benefit society but 
harm an individual.
The Nuremberg Code, written in 1947 
in response to experimentation done 
on prisoners in concentration camps in 
World War II, states that “no experiment 
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should be conducted where there is an 
a priori reason to believe that death or 
disabling injury will occur; except perhaps 
in those experiments where the experi-
mental physicians also serve as subjects” 
[15]. The Declaration of Helsinki, first 
published in 1964 and primarily directed 
to physicians, rejects even that exception 
[16]. The Declaration states that phys-
icians should only engage in research that 
safeguards the health of participants; the 
goal of new knowledge “can never take 
precedence over the rights and interests 
of individual research subjects” and that 
“the responsibility for the protection of 
research subjects must always rest with 
the physician and never with the research 
subjects, even though they have given con-
sent.” The Declaration goes on to state 
that “physicians may not be involved in a 
research study involving human subjects 
unless they are confident that the risks 
have been adequately addressed and can 
be successfully managed.” Finally, the 
Belmont Report, published in 1979 in 
response to the Tuskegee syphilis study, 
includes the concept of Beneficence: do 
no harm and maximize possible benefits 
[17]. For healthy people who are exper-
imentally infected with SARS-CoV-2 or 
any other infectious agent, there is poten-
tial harm and no benefit. Because there 
is no benefit, the ethical standard for 
human inoculation experiments is that 
the disease must be entirely self-limited 
or there must be a curative therapy [13, 
18], which currently does not exist for 
SARS-CoV-2.
Those who have advocated for 
SARS-CoV-2 challenges have stated 
that the risks of morbidity and mor-
tality in young healthy persons are 
negligible, based on extrapolated in-
fection rates, and therefore such in-
fections are permissible [1]. Those in 
opposition have stated that the risks of 
severe illness, death, protracted symp-
toms, and postinfectious complica-
tions such as thromboembolic events, 
prolonged pulmonary, cardiac, or renal 
dysfunction and cognitive impairment 
are substantial, based on the outcomes 
of young adults who tested positive 
for SARS-CoV-2 [8, 19]. For example, 
2.5% of those aged 20–29  years old 
who were diagnosed with SARS-CoV-2 
in Indiana have been sick enough to be 
hospitalized. However, as is discussed 
below, the severity of illness for many 
infectious agents is dose dependent. 
Thus, the truth of the matter is that 
no one can define the risks of SARS-
CoV-2 human challenges because we 
do not know the dose of SARS-CoV-2 
that causes severe infection in young 
healthy persons.
If we have learned anything from 
human infection experiments, for sev-
eral pathogens outcome is clearly 
dose dependent. For example, in our 
Haemophilus ducreyi skin infection 
model, volunteers develop infection 
(papules) at almost all inoculated sites 
in the 1–150 colony-forming unit (CFU) 
dose range; in 30% of the volunteers, all 
papules spontaneously resolve, whereas 
abscesses form in 70% of the volunteers 
[20]. This host effect is reproducible when 
the volunteers are challenged a second 
time [21]. For doses >150 CFUs, the host 
effect on outcome is lost in that abscesses 
develop at all sites; for doses >1000 CFUs, 
abscesses form too rapidly to mimic nat-
ural infection [20, 22]. In some models, 
the infectious dose is strain dependent; 
for example, there is 100-fold difference 
in the median infective dose (ID50) of 2 
gonococcal strains used to infect male vo-
lunteers [23]. For the initial human trials 
done with coronavirus 229-E in 1967, 
the infectious dose that caused common 
colds in 66% of the volunteers was only 
101.2 to 101.5 50% tissue culture infectious 
dose (TCID50). Some have advocated 
that initial dose-ranging experiments for 
SARS-CoV-2 challenges should include 
doses of 1  ×  102, 1  ×  103, and 1  ×  104 
TCID50 [2, 3], which are 3 logs lower than 
the doses used in recent influenza chal-
lenge models [24, 25]. However, if SARS-
CoV-2 operates in a very low and narrow 
dose range similar to coronavirus 229-E, 
we may not be able to easily distinguish 
between doses that lead to asymptomatic 
or mild infection versus those that cause 
severe disease and death in young healthy 
volunteers.
CONCLUSIONS
The emerging data from phase III trials 
showing the high efficacy of the Pfizer, 
Moderna, and AstraZeneca vaccines in 
the prevention of disease due to SARS-
CoV-2 lessen the argument for the de-
velopment of a SARS-CoV-2 challenge 
model. However, proponents have stated 
that a challenge model may be needed to 
evaluate next-generation vaccines in the 
setting of low levels of circulating virus 
[2]. Nevertheless, we conclude that the 
risks of a wild-type SARS-CoV-2 human 
challenge model cannot be defined but 
are potentially substantial, and, at this 
time, severe disease cannot be adequately 
managed. Although to some it may seem 
paternalistic, according to our ethical 
codes, in the absence of curative therapy, 
even if a volunteer consents, sponsors, 
physicians, and scientists are bound to 
refuse to conduct such trials. 
The SARS-CoV-2 pandemic has led to 
tremendous pressure to develop thera-
peutics and vaccines, which has resulted 
in premature acceptance of therapies, 
such as hydroxychloroquine, that proved 
to be toxic or not beneficial, because we 
did not follow longstanding rules of sci-
entific rigor [26]. Similarly, the pandemic 
should not lead us to ignore or revise our 
longstanding codes of ethics regarding 
human subjects research.
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